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POLITICAL PATRONAGE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONDITIONS: A LAST HURRAH FOR THE
PARTY FAITHFUL?
It is manifest that rapidly increasing portions of government budgets
are devoted to providing services-welfare, social security, health care,
and public housing-which encompass an almost limitless range of bene-
fits generally classified as government largess. As a function of the
increase in number and scope of these programs, there has been a con-
comitant increase in the number of employees required to staff admin-
istrative bureaucracies.' With nearly one out of every seven working
Americans on public payrolls, the government's pervasive role as an
employer, especially at the state level, is undergoing fresh examination.
This process of re-evaluation portends new problems for the institution
of political patronage, a system which has weathered several generations
of reform movements.
Although patronage floats like an iceberg on the political sea, nine-
tenths generally unseen,2 one highly visible aspect of the system is the
traditional mass firing of patronage workers that inevitably takes place
as one party succeeds another in the statehouse, governor's mansion, or
mayor's office. Critical questions arise when a succeeding administra-
tion dismisses or refuses to hire lower level personnel, who are not con-
sidered participants in the formulation or supervision of administration
policies, and who, unprotected by any civil service system,s hold their
positions solely through the favor of the dominant political party. If
the impassioned arguments which surround the system of patronage are
1. See generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as Reich].
2. Once thought of as consisting only of jobs, patronage includes the vast
range of favors awarded by constantly expanding governments whose in-
creased government spending-much of it discretionary-has brought in-
creased opportunities to political supporters. Nonofficeholders receive
construction contracts, defense contracts, banking and insurance funds, and
specialized treatment by the discretionary agencies of government whose
power continues to grow.
M. ToLcmN & S. ToLcHIN, To THE VICToa 5-6 (1971). [hereinafter cited as To THE
VICToa.]
3. Jean J. Couturier, executive director of the National Civil Service League, testified
before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations in 1969 that




eschewed, 4 attention can be focused on the constitutional issues in-
volved in the operation of patronage systems.
THE PRESENT DivisioN OF AUTHORITY
The several tribunals which have considered the patronage question
have demonstrated a disparity of opinion. Typical of the early cases
supporting the right to dismiss an employee for political reasons
is Bailey v. Richardson,5 which reasoned that since the government is
not obligated to employ an individual in the first instance, it is not
constrained thereafter from dismissing him for any or no reason. More
recendy, in Alomar v. D'wyer,6 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that if an employee is not covered by New York's Civil
Service Law, his employment is terminable at will; relying heavily on
Bailey, the court reasoned that, under such circumstances, no constitu-
tionally protected right is abridged. The court emphasized the long-
standing acceptance of the spoils system in concluding that protection
against dismissal for political reasons must come from the legislature.-
However, the recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis" may have signaled
the demise of the-political patronage system. When a new Illinois secre-
tary of state commenced wholesale dismissals of employees retained
by his predecessor,9 several members of the Employees Union sought
4. One of the usual justifications put forth by supporters of. the system is that
political parties, as we know them, would simply disappear if no longer held together
by the carrot and stick rewards of patronage. A sufficient rebuttal might emphasize
that our political system was not founded for the purpose of facilitating the organiza-
tion of political parties, and that, if necessary, they should give way in order to
preserve the rights of individuals.
5. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curianz by an equally divided Court, 341
U.S. 918 (1951).
6. 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1020 (1972); accord, Norton
v. Blaylock, 409 F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1969).
7. Accord, American Fed'n of State, County, & Municipal Employees v. Shapp, 443
Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375 (1971).
8. No. 4743 (7th Cir., Sept. 18, 1972).
9. In Illinois, the secretary of state has "more power than anyone else,"
according to Rep. John B. Anderson of Rockford, Ill. Without having
to "gimmice' the civil service as the governor does, [he) runs the largest
secretary of state office in the nation, reportedly controlling over 2,800
patronage-jobs iii: the bffice§ under his jurisdiction: motor vehicle registra-
tion, corporation- charters, index division (which administers election laws),
the registration of securities, and the state libraries.
To =n VicroR, supra note 2, at 106-07.
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relief, alleging that the dismissals were based solely upon political affili-
ation.'" The state's successful motion for summary judgment was re-
versed, and despite allegations that the firings were based on a need for
administrative efficiency, the court held that the motive for the firings
presented a question of fact requiring a full trial."
Essential to the court's conclusion was its holding that an individual
has a constitutionally protected right to participate in the political
process. 12 In determining the circumstances under which such a right
may be abridged, the court invoked a series of Supreme Court decisions,
beginning with United Public Workers v. Mitchell'3 and culminating
with the recently decided Perry v. Sinderman.-4 It was concluded that,
regardless of the discretionary nature of the government's prerogative
to hire or fire, it could not use its position to infringe constitutionally
protected rights.' 5 The court acknowledged that the interests of the
state might justify some curtailment of individual rights, but it placed
a heavy burden of justification upon the government-a burden the state
was unable to carry in Lewis.
It appears, therefore, that the Supreme Court may be called upon to
resolve the patronage question and to eliminate the existing division of
authority among the circuits. Resolution of the issues will necessitate
a re-examination of the constitutional precepts articulated in previous
decisions.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITY
It has long been recognized that freedom of political association is
protected by the first amendment. In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,6
for example, the Supreme Court declared "freedom of speech or press
[and] freedom of political association" '7 to be among the fundamental
rights protected by the Constitution.1 8 In N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama'9 and
10. No. 4743 at 2.
11. Id. at 4-5.
12. Id. at 5-6.
13. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
14. 92 S. Ct. 2694 (1972).
15. No. 4743 at 15.
16. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
17. Id. at 245.
18. See MECHEM, PUBLIC OFFIcEs AND OrICERs § 98 (1890): "[U]nder our republican
form of government, the legislature can not make the holding of any particular public
opinion a test of the right to hold office."
19. 357 US. 449 (1958).
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United States v. RobeI,20 the Court affirmed the Sweezy rationale and
concluded further that freedom of association is an inseparable aspect
of the "liberty" assured by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, as well as a specific guarantee of the first amendmenrt. 1
A finding that the Constitution protects political associations, how-
ever, is merely a point of departure. The controlling question, once
such rights have been identified, is clear: What kinds of state action are
limited by an individual's right to political association? More specifi-
cally, may a state accomplish through indirect means what it is con-
stitutionally forbidden to do directly?
THE STATE AS EMPLOYER: RIGHT VERSUS PRIVILEGE
When a constitutionally protected right is interjected into an em-
ployment situation, the broad questions which have been suggested be-
come less abstract and more manageable. In an employment context, it
becomes manifest that the provisions of the Constitution are susceptible
to circumvention or dilution by various means.
It has been argued that a state has no obligation to act as a public
employer in any capacity; consequently, when it elects to do so, it
ought to have the same rights vis-a-vis its employees that are enjoyed
by private employers. Since benefits can be withheld entirely, the state
may also attach conditions to receipt of its largess, as it deems advisable.
Proponents of this viewpoint contend, therefore, that the surrender
of political freedom may be required as a qualification for state employ-
ment. Justice Holmes' famous statement that one "may have a constitu-
tional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman" 22 has been cited frequently in support of this proposition.
Acknowledging that political activity normally is a protected freedom,
Holmes nevertheless sanctioned abridgement of that right by the state
qua employer, although direct prohibition would have run afoul of
constitutional limitations.
20. 389 US. 258 (1967).
21. 357 U.S. at 460. The incorporation of first amendment rights into the fourteenth
amendment is usually dated from Gitlow v. New York, 268 US. 652 (1925).
"[Tihe right to engage in political activity is an inherent right of citizenship, a
fundamental requisite to the democratic process, and it involves even more than free-
dom of speech, association and assembly." Nelson, Public Employees and the Right to
Engage in Political Activity, 9 VAN. L. Rzv. 27, 36 (1955).
22. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 518 (1892).
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Holmes' statement became a talisman of constitutional adjudication
for the next 75 years23 and served as a foundation for the rationale that
became known as the "right versus privilege" doctrine. Under this
label, the argument assumed a syllogistic form-if the government is doing
something it is not required to do, it is granting a "privilege"; since,
by definition, the grantee has no "right" of continuation of a "priv-
ilege," he has no grounds for complaint if the "privilege" is withheld
for any reason.
During the 1950's the Court invoked similar reasoning in upholding
the Hatch Act's interference with the first, ninth, and tenth amend-
ments;24 in sustaining prohibitions on state employment of those who
advocated, or were members of groups which advocated, overthrow
of the government by force or violence;25 in acknowledging the right
of a city to dismiss employees who refused to answer questions con-
cerning their activity in the Communist Party;26 and in upholding the
suspension of a physician's license following his conviction for failure
to produce papers concerning an organization which was under investi-
gation by the House Committee on Un-American Activities.
The difficulty with the "right versus privilege" doctrine and similar
reasoning is the manner in which it has been applied. The Holmesian
philosophy upon which it is based has been employed without serious
consideration of its basic premise-that the individual remains free to
choose between employment with the government and the exercise of
his constitutional rights.28 While it is true that an individual is not
actually forced, through the application of legal sanctions, to take the
former alternative, still, as a practical matter, the exercise of his rights,
especially the right of political association, will foreclose a substantial
23. "Shepardizing McAuliffe yielded more than 70 cases, 77 percent of which resolved
the decision against the constitutional claim being asserted." Van Astyne, The Demise
of the Right-Prfvilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. Rtv. 1439, 1441
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Van Alstyne].
24. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
25. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
26. Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958).
27. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954), aff'g 305 N.Y. 89, 111 NE.2d
222 (1953).
28. Although the doctrine normally is challenged on the ground that the government
may not accomplish indirectly what it is constitutionally forbidden to do directly (see
notes 32-36 infra & accompanying text), it seems that the most obvious line of attack
would be through application of the equal protection clause. The exercise of constitu-




and growing portion of the employment market. The doctrine is under
increasing challenge," and, while it has not yet been completely over-
ruled, it has been considerably vitiated by recent holdings.30
DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNCONSTITuTIoNAL CO ITIONs DocTRNE
In criticizing the right versus privilege doctrine, one commentator
has written: "... the power to impose conditions is not a lesser part
of the power to withhold, but instead is a distinct exercise of power
which must find its own justification." 3 1 While the right versus priv-
ilege doctrine was being developed in the area of government benefits,
the courts were grappling with the same fundamental considerations in
the area of interstate commerce. In Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v.
Railroad Commission of California,2 the Supreme Court recognized the
distinction between the power to impose conditions and the power to
withhold benefits, when it formulated the doctrine of "unconstitutional
conditions" to deal with state regulation of commerce. Justice Suther-
land enunciated the doctrine's purpose in Frost: "The naked question
which we have to determine... is whether the state may bring about
the same result by imposing the unconstitutional requirement as a con-
dition precedent to the enjoyment of a privilege, which, without so
deciding, we shall assume to be within the power of the state altogether
to withhold if it sees fit to do so." 3 This question was answered in the
negative:
It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general
rule, the state, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may
grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the
power of the state in that respect is not unlimited; and one of the
limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the
relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the
surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it
may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is conceivable
29. It has been argued, for example, that government spending, even discretionary
spending, should relate directly to the general welfare, and that conditioning of
benefits on the basis of political affiliation does not contribute to the general welfare.
Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960).
30. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); see notes 37-47 infra & accompanying
text.
31. Note, supra note 29, at 1609.
32. 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
33. Id. at 592-93.
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that guarantees embedded in the constitution of the United States
may thus be manipulated out of existence.3 4
Essential to an understanding of the doctrine is the realization that it
makes no attempt to confer upon the citizen a general right to the bene-
fits granted by the government. Clearly, as Justice Sutherland said in
Frost, the doctrine sets aside the question of right versus privilege and
merely holds that when the government does decide to provide a serv-
ice generally, it must refrain from using its powers to coerce a citizen
into relinquishing an entirely unrelated right over which the state may
exert no direct control.5
It is thus apparent that the courts have followed different paths
in dealing with closely related subjects-conditions upon the exercise
of individual rights, and conditions upon the right to participate in
commerce. Since the questions are so clearly analogous, the extension
of the doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," from commerce to
government benefits generally, was inevitable.
EXTENSION OF THE DOCTRINE
Commenting on the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine, one ob-
server has said: "[W]hatever an express constitutional provision for-
bids government to do directly it equally forbids government to do
indirectly. As a consequence... [t] he net effect is to enable an indi-
vidual to challenge certain conditions imposed upon his public employ-
ment without disturbing the presupposition that he has no 'right' to that
employment." 31
The Supreme Court has applied this rationale in several cases involv-
ing government attempts to deny certain benefits to Communists, to
enforce loyalty oath requirements, and to dismiss arbitrarily certain
non-tenured teachers and professors. In a series of cases arising under
34. Id. at 593-94.
35. See United States v. Chicago M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 282 U.S. 311, 328-29 (1931).
It should be noted that the Holmes aphorism was not entirely inconsistent with this
viewpoint, the difference arising chiefly with respect to what controls or restrictions
were considered justifiable-a question of. degree. Holmes concluded his analysis in
McAuliffe with the statement: "This condition seems to us reasonable.... ." In light of
the then inchoate status of what are now well-defined constitutional rights, it is
dangerous to attach much weight to his original conclusion as an expression of the
position which his court would have taken under present circumstances.
36. Van Alstyn, supra note 23, at 1445-46.
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the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1953,37 several state
courts invalidated implementing statutes which forbade the rental of
federally financed public housing to members of subversive organiza-
tons. In so doing, these courts rejected the assertion that indirect re-
strictions on political association are less violative of the Constitution
than direct means to the same end.38
The courts applied the same unequivocal standard in cases which
conditioned employment upon an affirmation of non-membership in
subversive groups. In striking down such a statute in Wieman v. Up-
degraff,9 the Supreme Court stated: "We need not pause to consider
whether an abstract right to public employment exists. It is sufficient
to say that constitutional protection does extend to the public servant
whose exclusion is patently arbitrary or discriminatory." 40 A similar
statute providing that public employees who refused to answer ques-
tions concerning their jobs would be dismissed without charge, notice,
or hearing was invalidated in Slocho'wer v. Board of Higher Education.41
Similarly, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,4 2 the Court, in overruling
an earlier decision,4 3 declared: "[C]onstitutional doctrine which has
emerged since that decision has rejected its major premise. That premise
was that public employment... may be conditioned upon the surrender
of constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct govern-
ment action... ." "
Analogous reasoning was employed in cases not involving direct
government employment. Thus, the "unconstitutional conditions" doc-
trine was applied in cases such as Speiser v. Randall,45 where a tax ex-
emption for veterans was conditioned upon the filing of a loyalty oath
37. "[N]o housing unit constructed under the United States Housing Act of 1937, as
amended, shall be occupied by a person who is a member of an organization designated
as subversive by the Attorney General: Provided further, That the foregoing prohibition
shall be enforced by the local housing authority... " Act of July 5, 1952, ch. 578, § 101,
66 Stat. 403. This section was not repeated in subsequent appropriations acts.
38. Lawson v. Housing Authority, 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605 (1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 882 (1957). See Chicago Housing Authority v. Blackman, 4 IMI. 2d 319, 122
N.E.2d 522 (1954); Peters v. New York Housing Authority, 307 N.Y. 519, 121 NE.2d
529 (1954).
39. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
40. Id. at 192.
41. 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
42. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
43. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 US. 485 (1952).
44. 385 U.S. at 605.
45. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
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with the local tax assessor, and Sherbert v. Verner,4 6 where South Caro-
lina denied unemployment benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist who
refused to accept employment that required Saturday labor. Shelton
v. Tucker,4 moreover, invalidated an ordinance requiring every teacher
to file a yearly statement revealing all organizations to which he be-
longed. Although the Court did not explicitly apply the "unconstitu-
tional conditions" doctrine, its opinion refers to the chilling effect of the
law upon a teacher's rights and implies that an unconstitutional effect is
prohibited.
It may be concluded that whatever the basis of any one decision-
due process, equal protection, or simply that the government may not
use indirect means to accomplish a forbidden result-the courts uni-
formly have rejected the proposition that the concept of an abstract
"right" to government benefits is controlling.
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS AND PATRONAGE
The application of the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine to
patronage employment practices yields the inescapable conclusion that
certain employees are protected, and the state may not exercise its
power as an employer to "purchase" 48 rights secured to those em-
ployees by the Constitution.49 However, if the burden of justifying its
employment practices is placed upon the state, this result might appear
to foreclose employment decisions necessary to administrative efficiency.
It arguably engrafts quasi-civil service status on employees the state has
chosen not to include in its own system. One means of resolving this
problem, however, is suggested by Freeman v. Gould Special School
District50 There, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit articu-
lated its view of discretionary dismissal: "In Arkansas the board's right
not to rehire a teacher in the school district appears to be absolute,
except that the decision must not rest on grounds that are violative of
46. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
47. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
48. Reich, supra note 1, at 764, 779.
49. It should be noted that the Supreme Court has not yet seen fit to extend the
doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" to political patronage. In fact, it recently
denied certiorari in Alomar v. Dwyer, 404 U.S. 1020 (1972). In addition, as noted in
Judge Campbell's concurring opinion in Employees Union, No. 4743 at 23, any mention
of Alomar and Sbapp conspicuously is absent from the opinion in Perry v. Sniderman,
40 U.S.L.W. 5088 (1972).
50. 405 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969).
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constitutional or legal rights." 51 Applying this logic to patronage cases,
a state may exercise its discretionary power of removal, and may refuse
to hire or rehire for any or no reason, as long as that reason does not
constitute an impermissible abridgement of protected rights 2
This approach has been hailed as a workable formula to accommodate
conflicting interests:
First, it preserves the appearance of judicial objectivity. A court
need not "weigh" or "balance"; it need simply apply the literal
mandate of a given constitutional provision flatly to forbid gov-
ernment from conditioning its largess on any waiver of such a pro-
vision regardless of the circumstances. A court may thus avoid
any unseemly appearance of acting as a superlegislature. Second,
the doctrine greatly expedites decision making and provides clear
guidelines in cases which might otherwise be especially difficult
to resolve.3
Although the test arguably lacks a satisfactory degree of flexibility in
situations where the government has a compelling interest in limiting
or qualifying individual freedom because of the nature of the job,4
this problem is not likely to arise within the narrow confines of well-
defined patronage cases, especially in light of the willingness of many
courts to allow "justifiable" restrictions of individual rights.5
A related problem is that of defining the protected class. The most
common proposal is that persons in policy making positions be ex-
cluded. 6 Such a distinction proves simple at either end of the employ-
ment spectrum, but would be almost impossible to accomplish where
51. Id. at 1158.
52. No attempt has been made in this Comment to discuss issues of procedural due
process. Without recognition of some minimum standard of conduct applied to the
government in its role as employer, the concept of due process is meaningless. Obviously,
a hearing in which an employee finds he has been released because of his political
affiliation is fruitless unless he has some substantive right to enforce. If the Freeman
rule is combined with the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine, however, the situation
is significantly different. Procedural due process becomes necessary to protect the
substantive right. See Van Alstyne, supra note 23, at 1453; Comment, Constitutional
Rights of Public Employees: Progress Toward Protection, 49 N.CJL. REv. 302 (1971).
53. Van Alstyne, supra note 23, at 1447.
54. Id. at 1449.
55. See, e.g., No. 4743 at 15.
56. Although the [constitutional protection] argument may be persuasive -
when the employee is not involved in policy making, it is not compelling
when an individual's position involves both the formulation and execution
of policy. Such a person is hired, in a very real sense, because of his
1973]
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the groups shade together. As Employees Union concluded,. 7 perhaps
the only sensible approach is to await a case-by-case adjudication of
the doctrine's limits.
More problematic are the practical limitations on the effectiveness of
the proposal. Protection against dismissal for political reasons may prove
illusory, since the employee must prove the political motive, and the
proposal apparently allows a state to maintain that its decision was arbi-
trary without putting forth specific reasons for its actions. On the other
hand, to the extent that the state is required to provide specific reasons
for discharging particular employees, its efforts to achieve administra-
tive efficiency may be thwarted, and the entire purpose of the proposal
defeated. Thus, problems of determining the amount of evidence nec-
essary to shift the burden of proof to the state, and determining what
procedural safeguards should be extended to the employee, must be
resolved before the effectiveness of the protection afforded the employee
can be established.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, in widely variant situations, consistently has
disregarded the question whether a citizen has a vested right to govern-
ment benefits58 and has utilized the "unconstitutional conditions" doc-
trine to invalidate government attempts to use those benefits in obtain-
ing leverage to compel the surrender of constitutional rights. Since it
has long been acknowledged that the right of political association is
constitutionally protected as a functional part of free speech, all that
is required to proscribe politically motivated dismissals is the applica-
tion of the Court's formula to that right. Indeed, it is difficult to under-
stand why the same protection that is routinely extended to members
of subversive organizations has not been extended uniformly to Repub-
licans and Democrats as well.
viewpoints. His job is to translate his beliefs into governmental action. If
dismissals such as those ... were constitutionally prohibited, the government
could not refuse to hire an individual for ... a position of policy formulation
and administration because his views were diametrically opposed to that
of the executive, and it would be virtually impossible to effectuate a change
in governmental policy.
Note, The First Amendment and Public Employees-An Emerging Constitutional Right
to be a Policeman? 37 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 409. 422 (1968).
57. No. 4743 at 25.
58. The question may be controlling, however, if the employee is asserting a viola-
tion of procedural due process. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 92 S. Ct. 2701 (1972).
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Apparently, the courts have perceived a tacit distinction between those
situations, perhaps based upon the long-standing public acceptance of
the spoils system.59 Yet, since no actual distinction is discernible from
the opinions, and unless a justifiable basis for treating politically moti-
vated dismissals as a separate class of cases is forthcoming, the consti-
tutional mandate seems to compel the abrogation of this aspect of
political patronage.
59. See, e.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam, 341
U.S. 918 (1951).
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